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CHAPTER 2 
European Elections as Counterfactual National Elections 
Marcel van Egmond 
 
 
European Parliament (EP) elections are not national parliamentary elections. Yet it is 
tempting to speculate about the consequences of EP election outcomes as if they were 
national parliamentary (NP) elections. Indeed, politicians and the media often discuss the 
outcomes of the European elections in terms that refer to the national, not the European 
political arena. In doing so it is commonplace to present the election outcome in terms of the 
composition of the national parliament had this election been a national one. Such a 
counterfactual representation, in which European parliamentary elections are presented as 
national parliamentary elections, will form the central perspective of this chapter. 
There are several reasons why a counterfactual representation of EP election 
outcomes may be of interest to us. If voters act similarly in European and national 
parliamentary elections, the outcomes of European parliamentary elections may have 
considerable consequences for the national political arena. Parties that fared well in the EP 
elections – when compared to the preceding NP elections – may see an increase in their 
national political clout. A coalition partner with a particularly successful EP result may want 
to cash in on its European success at the national level by demanding a greater say in 
government – even though their national vote share has not changed. The consequences may 
vary from a change in the direction of a government’s policies to a complete collapse of the 
coalition, and fall of the government.1 All on the basis of European elections that were 
treated as if they were national elections. However, the counterfactual representation may 
also show us the flipside of the coin: what if voters do not act the same in European and 
national parliamentary elections? What if they would not decide to back the same party in EP 
and NP elections, but instead support one party in European, and another one in national 
parliamentary elections? As will be shown below, some voters do actually vote for different 
                                                 
1  To illustrate various national consequences of the 1989 European elections: the outcome of the European 
Elections played a role in the eventual downfall of British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher (Franklin & Curtice, 
1996, p. 95); in Spain, electoral success in those same EP elections prompted the ruling PSOE to call early 
national elections (del Castillo, 1996, p. 266); while the reverse was the case in Italy, where the governing 
parties decided against calling early national elections following their disappointing showing in the European 
Elections (Mannheimer, 1996, p. 200). 
 
Ch. 2, p. 2 
parties in the different elections, even in those countries where these two elections are held on 
the same day. This outcome is not surprising at all. Since national and European elections are 
different elections for different representative bodies in different political arenas, there is no 
compelling need for voters to support the same party in both instances. In countries where 
national and European parliamentary elections are held concurrently, the actual election 
outcome offers us an opportunity to see to what extent party choice in European and national 
elections actually differs. In countries where the two elections are not held concurrently, we 
need to use the counterfactual approach which involves assessing how people would have 
voted had not European elections but national ones been on the calendar. This chapter 
explores the differences in election results between the 1999 EP election outcome and a NP 
election that would have been held on the same day (or that actually was concurrent, as 
happened in a few countries). 
There are several leads available to us if we want to answer the puzzles set out above. 
Existing research into EP elections has already taught us a few things, including the notion 
that these elections may be viewed as second-order national elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980), 
dominated mainly by national, not European political issues. Other scholars (van der Eijk & 
Franklin, 1996) have reported on previous European parliamentary elections and explored the 
possibilities to treat these as counterfactual national parliamentary elections. Both these 
strands of research will be further discussed below. In some countries however, we need not 
make counterfactual comparisons, since EP and NP elections were held concurrently in these 
countries. In Luxembourg, EP and NP elections have been held concurrently ever since the 
first European Parliament elections of 1979. In other countries, the concurrence of the two 
elections is due to happenstance – both electoral cycles ended at the same moment, as was the 
case in Belgium where the two elections were held concurrently as well. These coinciding 
elections enable us to compare turnout and voting patterns for both elections directly.2 The 
distribution of votes for both elections in Luxembourg and Belgium is presented in Table 
2.1.3
                                                 
 
2  One could wonder whether the differences between the results of concurrent elections are caused by 
differences in eligibility. Although such differences do indeed exist, all available evidence suggests that they 
concern such small numbers of people that the differences documented in Table 2.1 and further down in this 
chapter cannot be attributed to them. 
3  In Table 2.1, the outcome for national and European elections is presented for Belgium as a whole. The party 
systems of Wallonia and Flanders, the two regions that make up the Belgian federal state, differ 
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< TABLE 2.1 HERE, PLEASE > 
 
Are European parliamentary elections a good indicator of the outcome of national 
parliamentary elections? Table 2.1 shows that in Luxembourg and Belgium, the differences in 
outcomes between the two elections are small. Nevertheless, in both countries the two 
elections do not result in identical outcomes, and in some cases the differences are 
substantial. Some parties – Déi Greng in Luxembourg, the Parti Socialiste and Ecolo in 
Belgium – did markedly better in the European elections than in the national elections. The 
reverse is true for ADR in Luxembourg and all of the Flemish parties, who fared better in the 
national elections than they did in the European elections. Clearly, the outcome of European 
and national elections are not identical, even if the two elections are held on the same day. In 
addition, minor aggregate level shifts may conceal substantial variation at the individual level  
in the form of vote switching or split ticket voting (see also Table 2.4, below). On the other 
hand, the aggregate level differences are rather small, at least in these two countries, which 
suggests that one can very well regard the outcome of the EP elections as a proxy for NP 
elections at the same moment in time — they indeed seem to be second-order national 
elections. 
 What then if we want to make inferences about the national political situation based 
on European elections in countries where no concurrent national parliamentary elections were 
held? In those cases we need to revert to a counterfactual comparison. The European Election 
Survey of 1999 makes such a comparison possible, by asking respondents what party they 
would have voted for, if national parliamentary elections would be held the next day. On the 
basis of these answers, we can get an insight into what the distribution of votes would be at 
the national level. Since the respondents were also asked what their voting behavior was in 
the EP elections, we can compare the differences and similarities in voting behavior and 
aggregate outcomes for the two arenas. To what degree differ European Parliament elections 
from national elections in the different countries? Is there any systematic pattern in the 
differences that occur that is comparable across countries, or are these differences purely 
national affairs? 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
fundamentally, however. In the remainder of this chapter, Flanders and Wallonia will therefore be analyzed 
as separate political systems.  
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Comparing European and National parliamentary elections 
The respondents in all countries of the European Union were asked what they would have 
voted, were national parliamentary elections being held the next day.4 Respondents were 
asked to indicate the party they would have voted for, or that they would not participate in the 
elections. Table 2.2 presents, as an example, the results for Germany, first for the European 
Parliament elections, followed by the (hypothetical) national parliamentary elections, and the 
difference between the two.5 For illustrative purposes, the actual election results for the 
preceding 1998 national parliamentary elections have been included. 
 
< TABLE 2.2 HERE, PLEASE > 
 
Table 2.2 shows that parties fare differently in the European Parliament and in (hypothetical) 
national elections in Germany. This pattern is repeated in the other EU countries, the results 
of which are presented in the Appendix. As was the case in Luxembourg and Belgium, the 
German electorate distinguishes between European and national parliamentary elections, and 
adjusts its voting behavior accordingly, even if these are hypothetical elections. The 
differences must not be exaggerated: on the whole, no electoral landslides occur. A four 
percent-point difference between elections, however, as the Christian democratic CDU/CSU 
would experience, is a substantial difference. For the social democratic SPD, the difference 
amounts to well over two percent-points. Both parties do worse in the European elections 
than they would have in national parliamentary elections.  
A crucial advantage of the comparison of EP and counterfactual NP elections is 
illustrated if we compare the 1999 EP result with the actual parliamentary elections in 
Germany of 1998. A straightforward comparison of the two outcomes suggests that the 
German electorate had a considerable change of heart in the period of about one year, with 
the CDU/CSU the clear winner and the SPD in the doldrums. But that would be comparing 
apples and pears, as one can imagine the SPD response would be: the German electorate may 
simply prefer the CDU/CSU for the European Parliament, while still supporting the SPD for 
the national Bundestag. In other words, different political arenas may create different political 
winners. The counterfactual results disprove this reasoning, however. As the counterfactual 
                                                 
4  In Belgium and Luxembourg the actual voting behavior was asked. 
5  Note that the sample has been weighted so that the distribution of votes for the European Parliament reflects 
the distribution of the actual election outcome. 
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1999 NP vote shows, the CDU/CSU is winning in the EP elections, and it would do so in 
national elections as well. The electoral tide in Germany is indeed shifting away from the 
SPD. Regardless of the fact that the SPD would improve their vote share in NP elections, the 
gap between SPD and CDU/CSU would still increase from the actual 18.1 percent in the EP 
elections to 19.6 percent, had NP elections been held. And more importantly, the CDU/CSU 
would have gained an absolute majority – a feat not achieved since the mid-1950s. 
 Using the Pedersen index as a measure of change between the European and the 
national parliamentary elections, the change for Germany is 6.7 percent.6 . This underlines 
what was stated before, namely that no political landslides occur between concurrent 
elections for different parliaments, fought by the same set of parties. Germany is slightly 
below average in this respect, compared to the rest of the European Union member states, as 
Table 2.3 testifies.  
 
< TABLE 2.3 HERE, PLEASE > 
 
Table 2.3 shows that the Pedersen index for change between the European and national 
parliamentary vote shares varies between a low 4.2 percent in Spain to a high of 31.6 percent 
in Denmark. The average Pedersen index for the whole of the EU is 11.7 percent.7 
Denmark’s high score on this measure is explained by the fact that two of its political parties 
– the Juni Bevaegelsen and the Folke Bevaegelsen – do not compete in national elections, but 
only in European Parliament elections, and do so very successfully. Supporters of these two 
parties will have to switch to a different party in national elections, leading to a high Pedersen 
index. 
 
Sources of vote share variation 
 
                                                 
6  The Pedersen index is defined as the sum of the absolute differences in vote share for all parties, divided by 
two. 
7  The analyses presented here exclude Northern Ireland. The party system of Northern Ireland differs to such a 
degree from the British system that inclusion in that system would not be fruitful, while the small sample size 
for Northern Ireland precludes inclusion in the analyses as a separate system.  
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Two causes can be distinguished for the differences between EP and (counterfactual or 
concurrent) NP election results presented in the previous section. Voters may either vote for 
different parties in the two elections, or they may participate unevenly in them. 
Quasi-switching 
One obvious explanation for differences in party distributions between elections is that voters 
support different parties in each election. Over time, this change is of course – to a certain 
degree – common to any party landscape: parties evolve in terms of performance, policies, 
leaders and so on, and individual voters may change in their political experiences, outlook 
and opinions. Together, they almost unavoidably result in different choices of individuals in 
different elections, a major source of differences in election results over time. But our focus 
here is on comparison of simultaneous choices (one of which is of a counterfactual nature). 
Apparently, for whatever reasons, some voters prefer one party for the European parliament 
and a different one for the national parliament. This is not an uncommon feature in electoral 
behavior; it is comparable to what is called split-ticket voting in American elections, where 
voters often support a presidential candidate from one party and a congressional candidate 
from the other party. In this chapter, this concept of split-ticket voting will be referred to as 
switching, or rather as quasi-switching, since we are referring to hypothetical national 
elections for all but two countries.8 Part of the variation in party vote share may be caused by 
quasi-switching.  
Table 2.3 suggests that the impact of quasi-switching is likely to be limited in most 
countries, if we look at electoral outcomes at the aggregate level. Shifting the focus to the 
level of the individual voter shows that this would actually be a rash conclusion, as Table 2.4 
demonstrates. 
 
< TABLE 2.4 HERE, PLEASE > 
 
Table 2.4 presents the percentage of EP voters that qualify as quasi-switchers. As the table 
shows, in most countries this is a substantial number of voters, with the EU-average varying 
between 17.6 and 20.5 percent for different European election years. This means that on 
average no less than one out of every five voters votes for a different party in the EP elections 
than they would in a national parliamentary election at the same moment. 
                                                 
8  Confer for the concept of quasi-switching to Van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996. 
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Table 2.4 also shows that the percentage of quasi-switchers is not constant; it varies 
between countries, and within countries over time. Some countries, such as Denmark and 
Ireland, show particularly high numbers of quasi-switchers, while others, such as Greece and 
Portugal are consistently low in this respect. France and Spain show considerable variation in 
the percentage of quasi-switchers over time. This variation within and between countries may 
have several causes, which makes this variable by itself worthy of further exploration. The 
degree of quasi-switching may be a characteristic of the political culture of a country: a high 
degree of party loyalty in a system will depress the number of quasi-switchers, while the 
opposite creates the potential for high numbers of quasi-switchers. But the variation may also 
be influenced by characteristics of the party system. In Denmark, two of the most successful 
parties in the EP elections do not compete in the national parliamentary elections, forcing its 
following to choose a different party in the NP elections. This will, by definition, create high 
numbers of quasi-switchers, as mentioned above. 
 
Turnout effects  
Currently, one significant feature of European parliamentary elections is their rather poor 
turnout in most EU countries (see also Chapter 1). In the absence of compulsory voting, 
turnout levels for the 1999 elections were half, or even less than half of the level of turnout 
common for national parliamentary elections in many EU countries. Table 2.5 presents an 
overview of the EP participation rate, compared to the previous national parliamentary 
elections in the respective countries.9 In countries where compulsory voting laws are in effect 
(Belgium, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg), turnout is very similar in European and national 
parliament elections. In countries without compulsory voting, EP turnout is on average 32.3 
percent lower. 
 
< TABLE 2.5 HERE, PLEASE > 
 
By itself, turnout variations need not influence the distribution of votes. If supporters of all 
parties participate in both elections in equal proportions, no variations in vote shares will 
occur. The point is, of course, that we cannot beforehand rule out that turnout may be 
                                                 
9  For Belgium and Luxembourg, this comparison involves the concurrent national election, not the most recent 
previous one.  
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selective, and indeed it is often suggested by politicians and commentators alike that 
supporters of different parties do not participate in equal proportions in both elections. 
Selective turnout effects may cause variation in the electoral success of parties between the 
two types of elections, and are therefore a second possible source for variation in party vote 
shares. 
 Of course, it is impossible to determine from aggregate numbers to what degree 
differences in parties’ vote share in the EP and NP can be attributed to quasi-switching, or to 
turnout effects. The two effects may even work in different directions: a positive quasi-
switching effect may be offset, partially or completely, by a negative turnout effect, and vice 
versa. To determine what effect worked in what direction for a particular party in a given EU 
country we need more than mere election outcomes. 
Fortunately, the EES data is able to give us an insight into the importance of quasi-
switching and turnout effects for the difference between national and European election 
outcomes. This is because we not only know what party each respondent (would have) voted 
for in the two elections, but also whether they would (or did) participate in the elections.10 By 
comparing the voting behavior of participants of the EP election with those who did not turn 
out to vote, we can determine which parties lost out because of selective turnout effects, and 
which parts of the electorate switched from one party in the EP elections to another party in 
the national elections. 
 
Establishing quasi-switching effects and turnout effects 
Table 2.6, below, presents a partial repeat of Table 2.2, above, showing how the German 
parties fared in the European Parliament elections, and how they would have done were a 
national parliamentary election held at the same time. In addition Table 2.6 presents the 
extent to which these differences were brought about by quasi-switching and by selective 
turnout. To determine which part of the vote share variation for a party can be attributed to 
quasi-switching or to a turnout effect, we need to know three things: choice of party in the 
                                                 
10  Of course, this data is not without its flaws. There is some discussion in the literature as to the validity 
of questions regarding electoral participation (Cf. Katosh & Traugott, 1981; see also Visscher, 1995; Smeets, 
1995). Typically, respondents would rather not admit that they did not participate in the election, leading to 
an inflated rate of participation. In our case, the problem is not so great. The rate of participation in the EP 
elections in most countries of the EU is so low that most respondents appeared to have no qualms admitting 
they did not participate. 
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European elections, the choice of party in the (hypothetical) national elections for the whole 
of the sample, and again the choice of party in the (hypothetical) national elections, but now 
only for participants in the European elections.11 The turnout effect is determined as the 
difference in NP-vote share for participants in EP elections, compared to the vote share of 
that party for all respondents in the sample. In other words, the popularity of the party 
amongst those who turned out to vote in EP elections is compared to the popularity of the 
party amongst the whole of the electorate. To determine quasi-switching, we compare the 
vote share of a party in the EP elections to the vote share of that party in the (hypothetical) 
national elections, for participants in the EP elections only. Both of these effects can be 
positive or negative, and the sum of the two equals the difference in party success in EP and 
national elections. 
 
< TABLE 2.6 HERE, PLEASE > 
 
Table 2.6 shows that the CDU/CSU combination polled over 4 percent points lower in the EP 
elections than it would have if a national parliamentary election would have been fought. 
However, this change cannot be attributed solely to voters making different choices in 
different types of elections, nor can it be attributed solely to the effect of selective turnout. As 
the negative quasi-switch effect in Table 2.6 shows, 5.9 percent of the electorate would have 
voted for the CDU/CSU if this were a national election, but instead opted for another party in 
the EP elections. Compensating this, however, is the fact that CDU/CSU voters prove to have 
a higher tendency to participate in the EP elections than the German electorate in general. As 
a consequence, there is a positive turnout effect of 1.8 percent, pushing up the CDU/CSU 
vote share in the European elections. The net effect is therefore a vote share that is 4.1 
percent lower than it would have been in a national parliamentary election. 
In overview, Table 2.6 shows us several findings regarding quasi-switching and 
turnout effects. The first is that most of the differences are small in magnitude. No great shifts 
occur – neither in total, nor in terms of the two components separately. In addition, there is 
little regularity to be observed in the direction of turnout and quasi-switching effects: both 
may occur in the same direction or in conflicting directions, and no clear patterns in positive 
                                                 
11 On this matter, see van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996, Chapter 3. 
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of negative effects can be observed.12 However, in general turnout effects tend to be 
substantially smaller than quasi-switching effects, a pattern that is repeated in all countries of 
the European Union but one – the Netherlands – as Table 2.7 shows (below). 
 
< TABLE 2.7 HERE, PLEASE > 
 
Table 2.7 shows that there is considerable similarity in size for the quasi-switching effect in 
the different countries of the European Union, as is the case for the turnout effects in the 
different countries.13 For quasi-switching, the largest value is found in Denmark. This is not 
surprising, considering the fact that there are a number of successful anti-EU parties active in 
Denmark that participate only in EU elections. As mentioned, their success is by definition a 
manifestation of quasi-switching: in national elections their supporters will have to choose 
another party. Turnout effects prove smaller than quasi-switching effects in all countries 
except the Netherlands, where the average turnout effect is nearly 4 times larger than the 
quasi-switching effect. No ready explanation that reaches beyond the level of ad hoc 
explanations is available here.14 Findings for other countries are in line with findings for 
previous EP elections (Cf. van der Eijk, Franklin & Mackie, 1996).  
 
Explaining Quasi-switching and Turnout effects 
 
The previous section showed that it is possible to distinguish between two sources of 
differences between outcomes of European and national parliamentary elections, namely 
quasi-switching and turnout effects. As Table 2.6 and the tables in the Appendix show, the 
magnitude of these two effects varies considerably between parties. In this section, these 
variations in turnout and quasi-switching effects will be investigated at the party level by 
                                                 
12 Correlation coefficients per country for the relations between quasi-switching and turnout effects prove 
significant in only 3 out of 16 cases: Italy (-.55), Finland (-91) and Portugal (+.96). The magnitude of the 
correlation in especially these last two countries suggests that further investigation into this matter (especially 
over time) is warranted. Such lies outside of the scope of this chapter, however.   
13 Separate country tables reporting quasi-switching and turnout effects per party are presented in the 
Appendix. 
14 In the 1994 EP elections in the Netherlands, the turnout effect was larger than the quasi-switching effect too, 
though to a far lesser degree. In the 1989 elections however, the turnout effect was slightly smaller than the 
quasi-switching effect. 
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means of OLS-regression analysis. Our units of analysis will be the political parties 
participating in the European Parliament elections of 1999. In all, 111 parties are available for 
analysis. Can the characteristics of these parties explain why some of them encounter a 
positive, while others a negative turnout or quasi-switching effect? And what determines the 
size of these effects? 
Quasi-switching 
It has been argued frequently that European Parliament elections are elections that are not 
about European issues, but instead about national issues. In this respect, the term second-
order national elections has been coined by Reif and Schmitt (1980). Such elections are 
dominated by the domestic political system. The elections are thus not fought on the issues 
that concern the body to be elected – i.e., the European Parliament – but rather on issues that 
are of importance to the domestic political arena, such as for instance a vote in favor or 
against the national government. 
If indeed EP elections would be dominated by national policy issues, a party’s policy 
stance on European issues would be of no consequence for its electoral success in European 
elections. We will therefore analyze whether a party’s perceived position regarding European 
integration is of influence on the degree of quasi-switching for that party. The party stance on 
EU-integration is measured as the interpolated median of a party’s stance as perceived by the 
respondents of the European Election Study 1999. Low values indicate an adverse, while 
high values indicate a positive stance towards EU integration. Absence of a statistically 
significant effect for this explanatory factor would indicate that parties’ enthusiasm or 
skepticism regarding European integration is no reason for voters to switch parties between 
EP and NP elections. A significant effect would put some limitations on the second-order 
theory. The direction of any significant effect indicates what kind of parties benefit from a 
quasi-switch effect: negative when Euroskeptic parties benefit from quasi-switching, positive 
when pro-integration parties benefit. Previous research (Oppenhuis, van der Eijk & Franklin, 
1996) could not establish a statistically significant effect of this variable. 
A tendency that could be established in previous research (Oppenhuis et al, 1996) was 
the propensity of voters to vote for smaller or politically more extreme parties in European 
elections. The reasoning for this can again be connected to the second-order theory. If 
elections appear to be less consequential to voters, they may be more willing to vote for more 
radical, or less influential parties. Such parties may actually better reflect a voters’ political 
preference in the national political arena, but at the same carry too little political clout or 
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appear too much of a risk to be supported in a first-order election. Second-order elections 
would then prove an excellent opportunity for these voters to support the party they actually 
prefer – without any of the possibly nasty consequences. This thesis will be tested through the 
use of three variables. Two of these variables measure the extremity of a party’s stance on the 
aforementioned EU-integration issue and on the left-right dimension, by calculating the 
distance of a party’s perceived median position and the midpoint (5.5) of each of the two 
scales. Positive effects for these variables would suggest that extreme parties are more 
successful in the EP elections than in a national parliamentary election at the same time. The 
third variable is the size of a party, measured as its vote share in the preceding national 
election. Smaller parties are expected to do better in EP elections than in NP elections (i.e., 
negative relation between size of party and quasi-switching), since they will be less burdened 
by their limited size in EP elections than in NP elections. The last party characteristic 
included in the model is a party’s perceived left-right position. Although of potential interest, 
no prior assumptions towards both the existence as well as the direction of any effect of this 
variable will be specified here.    
Any of the effects of party characteristics mentioned in the previous paragraph may 
be influenced by characteristics of the election or of the political context. Several such 
contextual characteristics have been suggested in the literature: the state of the economy, the 
position of the EP election in the domestic electoral cycle, and so on. National parliamentary 
elections following shortly on the European Parliament elections may turn the latter into a 
crucial last rehearsal, of particular importance for government contenders. To test for such 
potential interactions, a variable indicating the position of the EP election in the domestic 
electoral cycle is included in the model. In the analyses, the electoral cycle is standardized to 
correct for differences in term length between countries, and runs from zero to one. Zero 
indicates that the EP elections were held ‘the day after’ national parliamentary elections, 
while ‘1’ indicates that both elections are held concurrently.15
Table 2.8 presents the outcome of a regression analysis on quasi-switching in which 
the explanatory potential of the factors described above was tested. Only few of the factors 
yielded statistically significant coefficients, and only these were included in the model 
                                                 
15 The specification of the model tests for a linear effect of this variable, although a curvilinear relationship, in 
which more emphasis is put on the period shortly before or after a national election can be conceived of as 
well. Additional analyses proved that the two operationalizations produced virtually identically fitting 
models. 
 
Ch. 2, p. 13 
presented in Table 2.8. Variables not included in the model did not prove influential in 
explaining quasi-switching.16
 
< TABLE 2.8 HERE, PLEASE > 
 
Table 2.8 presents a model that attempts to explain quasi-switching effects in European 
Parliament elections. The model is based on a regular OLS regression analysis, with political 
parties as the units of analysis. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimation, 
Huber 1967; White 1980) are used, because the dependent variable is related for subgroups of 
the sample: one party’s gain in an election means other parties will have to lose. 
The first variable of the model in Table 2.8 indicates that, although at times it is 
argued otherwise, EP elections are, at least to a certain degree, influenced by European 
issues. The significant and negative estimate of a party’s stance on EU integration indicates 
that this issue is of importance to voters: parties that take a negative stance towards EU 
integration benefit systematically (albeit slightly) from quasi-switching in the 1999 EP 
elections. EP elections are thus, at least to some extent, also about European issues, or more 
precisely about anti-European issues.  
The left-right position of parties is included in the model in two ways. The negative 
estimate for left-right position by itself indicates that left-wing parties fared better in the EP 
elections of 1999 than right-wing parties did. This estimate is, however, not statistically 
significant, in contrast to findings of for instance Pacek and Radcliff (2003). When 
controlling for left-right position, the extremity of a party’s left-right position is of significant 
influence. Perhaps surprisingly in view of previous findings (cf. Oppenhuis et al, 1996), and 
in view of what second-order election theory suggests, extreme parties do not systematically 
benefit from quasi-switching, but do rather worse in these terms, as is indicated by the 
negative estimate (at least as far as 1999 is concerned).   
The most influential factor of the model is size of party, measured here as vote share 
(0-100 percent) in the previous national parliamentary election. In the model it is the most 
                                                 
16 The estimated model presented in Table 2.8 consists of the variables presented in that table only. A number 
of variables (measures of the potential and unshared electorate of a party) did show a significant bivariate 
relationship with quasi-switching. However, none of these produced statistically significant effects in the 
multivariate regression models. 
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influential factor, and, in accordance with expectations, smaller parties perform better than 
larger parties. 
Lastly, two factors concerning the electoral context are examined. Although the EP 
elections are all held at virtually the same moment – June 10 or 13, 1999 – this moment can 
take a different position in the domestic electoral cycle each country. In some countries, such 
as Finland, the EP elections followed shortly upon the national parliamentary elections, while 
in other countries such as Ireland they fell somewhere in the middle of the cycle. In Austria 
and Portugal the 1999 EP elections fell shortly before the national elections, while, as we 
have seen, in Belgium and Luxembourg the EP elections actually coincided with national 
elections. As Oppenhuis et al (1996) argued, EP elections held shortly before a national 
election may take on a role of increased importance, giving voters a last option to air their 
opinions without too many consequences for government power, while parties may get a last 
indication about their electoral position. Large parties may thus fare better late in the cycle, 
compared to how they would have done in EP Elections following shortly after a national 
election. 
The influence of the electoral cycle by itself does not allow for substantive 
interpretation.17 It is included in the model because its interaction with size of the party is 
significant. This interaction term indicates whether the effect of party size on quasi-switching 
varies over the course of the domestic electoral cycle. The positive sign of this effect (see 
Table 2.8), indicates that larger parties are less hurt by quasi-switching in EP elections 
towards the end of the cycle, in other words, when a European election is held shortly before 
national elections. This interaction term therefore offsets the negative effect of party size, 
although it fully compensates for this negative effect only at the very end of the cycle: at 94 
percent of the cycle, to be exact.18 In a standard 4 year term, this would mean that the size of 
a party will have a positive impact only if the EP election is held in the last trimester before 
the national elections. If the EP elections are held earlier in the cycle, the size of the party has 
a negative impact. 
                                                 
17 The position of the EP election in the electoral cycle is a system characteristic, and thus applies to all parties 
in a system equally. As quasi-swiching can have a positive effect for some parties and a negative effect for 
other parties within a political system, a uniform system characteristic such as the electoral cycle cannot 
explain quasi-switching. The electoral cycle may be of influence on the absolute size of the quasi-switching 
effect, but that requires a different analytical approach from the one presented here. 
18 Direct effect of party size (.240) divided by interaction between electoral cycle*party size (.256) = .9375. 
Therefore, if electoral cycle is .937 or larger, party size will have a positive influence. 
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Turnout effects 
Turnout effects are actually selective turnout effects: some parties benefit, while others are 
being hurt by the typically lower turnout rates in European Parliament elections (see also the 
tables in the Appendix of this chapter). It may be that certain parties are particularly 
susceptible to a turnout effect because their electorate proves particularly unwilling to 
participate in EP elections, or because they manage poorly in mobilizing their potential voters 
for lack of effort, or sundry other reasons. Conversely, some parties may benefit because their 
electorate shows a particularly high propensity to participate. Parties that are able to mobilize 
their support can gain considerably in elections where turnout is relatively low.  
Explanations of turnout effects should therefore be cast in terms of characteristics of 
parties that would be related to the stability and dedication of their support base. A series of 
similar regression analyses as reported above was conducted with parties’ turnout effect as 
dependent variable. As independent and contextual variables we used the same factors as in 
the analyses of quasi-switching. None of these showed any statistically significant 
relationships, however.19 The implication is that although parties are differentially affected 
by selective turnout, the factors that determine the direction and the magnitude of these 
effects are largely idiosyncratic in nature, not captured by general party characteristics (size, 





It was the aim of this chapter to explore the differences between parties’ electoral success in 
European and national parliamentary elections. The outcomes of EP elections were compared 
to concurrent (actual and counterfactual) NP elections. The results showed that EP and NP 
elections are different. Parties’ vote shares differ in European election from what they are or 
would have been in national elections at the same moment in time. Moreover, as Table 2.5 
showed, substantial numbers of voters support different parties for different jobs – national or 
                                                 
19 Cross-national analyses of turnout effects will suffer from heteroskedasticity problems, as the differences in 
turnout – and hence possible turnout effects – vary substantially between countries. Various approaches can 
be taken to amend this problem, including the use of quasi-likelihood estimation (Papke & Wooldrigde, 
1996) or the inclusion of the size of the national drop in turnout as a controlling factor (signed positive or 
negative, in accordance with the turnout effect. Cf. van der Eijk & van Egmond, forthcoming). Both 
approaches were applied in separate analyses, without leading to a change in outcomes. 
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European. The differences in electoral success in the two kinds of elections are the sum of 
two different components: the effect of differential turnout on the one hand, and the –on 
average much larger– effect of quasi-switching on the other. When looking at parties, we 
found that how they are affected by differential turnout is largely inexplicable by general 
party characteristics. This contrasts sharply with how they are affected by quasi-switching. 
As the regression analysis of Table 2.8 showed, these differences can to a considerable extent 
be explained by characteristics of the political parties. The analysis showed that their position 
pro or contra further integration plays a significant role. Parties touting an anti-integration 
stance proved to benefit from quasi-switching in the 1999 EP elections, something which 
could not be established in previous EP elections. In line with expectations, smaller parties 
also largely benefited from this, although progressively less so towards the end of the 
national electoral cycle, where the relationship is reversed.
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Appendix 
This appendix contains country tables reporting the outcomes of the 1999 European 
Parliament elections. For each party in the different countries, the following figures are 
reported: vote share in the 1999 European Parliament elections; the counterfactual vote share, 
had national parliamentary elections been held instead; followed by the signed difference in 
percentage points between these two figures. This difference is subsequently assigned to  
Quasi-switching and Turnout effects, both reported in percentage points (positive effects 
indicate gain in European election, compared to hypothetical national elections). The country 
tables can be seen as a contraction of the more detailed tables that were presented for 
Germany in Tables 2.2 and 2.6 in the main text of this chapter. 
Asterisks indicate government parties at the time of the EP elections. For 
Luxembourg and Belgium, actual NP vote was registered. For France and the Netherlands, 
ballot list agreements required that for several parties only combined figures can be 
presented. The party names for these parties are reported in italics. 
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 AUSTRIA EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
SPÖ* 31.7 35.9 -4.2 -7.0 2.8 
ÖVP* 30.7 24.1 6.6 5.5 1.1 
FPÖ 23.6 29.2 -5.6 -0.6 -5.0 
Grüne 9.1 6.5 2.6 1.5 1.1 
Liberales Forum 2.6 2 0.6 0.4 0.2 
Other 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.2 -0.2 
Pedersen index     9.8 7.6 5.2 
            
BELGIUM: FLANDERS EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
SP* 14.1 15.2 -1.1 -1.2 0.1 
VLD 21.7 16.4 5.3 5.2 0.1 
Agalev 12 12.6 -0.6 -0.7 0.1 
CVP* 21.6 21 0.6 1.1 -0.5 
Vlaams Blok 15.1 20.8 -5.7 -5.8 0.1 
VU-ID21 12.1 8.4 3.7 3.6 0.1 
Other Dutch language party 1.8 1 0.8 0.8 0.0 
Pedersen index     8.9 9.2 0.5 
            
BELGIUM: WALLONIA EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
PS* 25.6 25.4 0.2 0.9 -0.7 
PRL-FDF-MCC 26.8 31.4 -4.6 -4.8 0.2 
Ecolo 22.5 24.7 -2.2 -2.3 0.1 
PSC* 5.7 3.4 2.3 2.1 0.2 
FN 1.6 3.3 -1.7 -1.9 0.2 
Other: French language party 8.1 5 3.1 3.3 -0.2 
Pedersen index     7.1 7.7 0.8 
            
BRITAIN  EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
Conservative 35.7 31.9 3.8 -0.1 3.9 
Labour* 28.1 45.3 -17.2 -6.2 -11.0 
Liberal Democrat 12.6 15.2 -2.6 -5.5 2.9 
SNP 3.3 1.9 1.4 0.9 0.5 
Plaid Cymru 2.8 1 1.8 0.0 1.8 
Green Party 6.2 2.5 3.7 2.9 0.8 
UKIP UK INdependentParty 7 0 7.0 7.0 0.0 
Uk Unionist Party 0 0.5 -0.5 -0.7 0.2 
SDLP 0 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 
Other 4.2 1.5 2.7 1.8 0.9 
Pedersen index           
            
DENMARK  EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
Socialdemokratiet* 16.5 24.1 -7.6 -7.8 0.2 
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Venstre 23.3 34.7 -11.4 -11.4 0.0 
Det Konservative Folkeparti 8.6 6.2 2.4 2.5 -0.1 
Socialisk Folkeparti 7.1 14.9 -7.8 -7.7 -0.1 
JuniBevaegelsen 16.2 0 16.2 16.2 0.0 
FolkeBevaegelsen mod EU 7.3 0 7.3 7.3 0.0 
Dansk Folkeparti 5.8 6.1 -0.3 1.3 -1.6 
Centrum-Demokraterne 3.5 2.2 1.3 1.4 -0.1 
Det Radikale Venstre* 9 5 4.0 2.7 1.3 
Enhedslisten - Dei RodGronne 0 2.2 -2.2 -2.8 0.6 
Kristeligt Folkeparti 2 1.6 0.4 -0.1 0.5 
Fremskridtpartiet 0.4 1.8 -1.4 -0.5 -0.9 
other 0.3 1.2 -0.9 -1.0 0.1 
Pedersen index     31.6 31.4 2.8 
            
FINLAND EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
SDP* 17.8 21.4 -3.6 -4.4 0.8 
Keskustas 21.2 20.5 0.7 1.3 -0.6 
Kokoomus* 25.4 28.4 -3.0 -8.5 5.5 
RKP* 5.4 4 1.4 0.2 1.2 
Vihreät* 13.4 12.5 0.9 5.2 -4.3 
Vasemmistoliito* 9.1 7.6 1.5 3.0 -1.5 
Krisrilliset 1.8 2.4 -0.6 0.4 -1.0 
other 6 3.2 2.8 3.0 -0.2 
Pedersen index     7.3 13.0 7.6 
            
FRANCE EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
UDF 9.3 8.6 0.7 0.8 -0.1 
PC* 6.8 6.2 0.6 -0.4 1.0 
Les verts* 9.7 8.5 1.2 1.5 -0.3 
Lutte Ourvier-LCR (Laguiller/Krivine) 4.7 3.8 0.9 1.1 -0.2 
Rassemblement pour la France 13 0 13.0 13.0 0.0 
PS-PRG-MDC (Holland/Chevenement) 22.1 33.8 -11.7 -11.5 -0.2 
RPR-DL (Sarkozy/Madelin)* 12.8 22.5 -9.7 -10.0 0.3 
FN (Le Pen) 2.9 1.9 1.0 0.8 0.2 
MN Megret 1.2 0 1.2 1.2 0.0 
CNPT Saint Josse 4.1 1.3 2.8 3.3 -0.5 
PR Leotard   0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 
UDC   1 -1.0 -0.4 -0.6 
other 13.5 12.2 1.3 1.0 0.3 
Pedersen index     22.7 22.6 1.9 
            
GERMANY  EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
CDU/CSU 48.7 52.8 -4.1 -5.9 1.8 
SPD* 30.6 33.2 -2.6 0.9 -3.5 
Bundis90/Grünen* 6.4 5.9 0.5 0.0 0.5 
FDP 3 2 1.0 0.8 0.2 
PDS 5.8 1 4.8 4.7 0.1 
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other 5.4 5.1 0.3 -0.6 0.9 
Pedersen index     6.7 6.5 3.5 
            
GREECE  EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
PASOK* 32.9 34.7 -1.8 -1.8 0.0 
New Democracy 36 42.1 -6.1 -6.3 0.2 
KKE (communists) 8.7 7.3 1.4 0.8 0.6 
Synaspismos 5.2 3.9 1.3 1.1 0.2 
DIKKI 6.9 5.5 1.4 1.5 -0.1 
other 10.3 6.4 3.9 4.7 -0.8 
Pedersen index     8.0 8.1 1.0 
            
IRELAND  EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
Fianna Fail* 38.5 42.7 -4.2 -5.9 1.7 
Fine Gael 24.6 24.4 0.2 -1.4 1.6 
Labour 8.7 11.9 -3.2 -2.8 -0.4 
Progressive Democrats* 0 2 -2.0 -2.7 0.7 
Sinn Fein 6.3 8.2 -1.9 0.3 -2.2 
Green Party 6.7 7 -0.3 1.0 -1.3 
Democratic Left 0 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 
Independent 13.1 0 13.1 13.1 0.0 
other 2 3.5 -1.5 -1.4 -0.1 
Pedersen index     13.3 14.5 4.1 
            
ITALY  EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
Forza Italia 25.2 26.4 -1.2 -2.1 0.9 
Democratici di sinistra* 17.4 21.3 -3.9 -3.9 0.0 
Alleanza nazionale 10.3 13.8 -3.5 -3.8 0.3 
Lista Panella\Bonino 8.4 6.4 2.0 2.2 -0.2 
I Democratici* 7.7 7.1 0.6 0.8 -0.2 
Lega Nord 4.5 4.1 0.4 0.7 -0.3 
Rifondazione communista 4.3 5.3 -1.0 -1.1 0.1 
PPI partido Populare Italiane* 4.3 3.1 1.2 1.0 0.2 
CCD Centro Dristiano Democratico 2.6 2.1 0.5 0.6 -0.1 
SDI Scoialistici Democratici Italiani 2.1 2.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 
CDU Cristiani Democratici Uniiti 2.1 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.1 
Communisti Italiani 2.2 1.5 0.7 0.7 0.0 
Federazione dei Verdi 1.8 1.5 0.3 0.4 -0.1 
UDR Unione Democratici per europa 1.6 0.9 0.7 0.8 -0.1 
Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore 1 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Liberali\Repubblicani 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Rinnovamento Italiani 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.7 -0.1 
Pensionati 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 
other 2.5 1.6 0.9 1.4 -0.5 
Pedersen index     9.8 11.0 1.7 
            
LUXEMBOURG EP Vote Counterfactual Difference Quasi- Turnout 
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(%) NP Vote (%) (EP-NP) switching Effect 
      
CSV/PCS* 31.9 30.3 1.6 1.1 0.5 
DP/PD 20.8 23.8 -3.0 -3.0 0.0 
LSAP/POSL* 23.1 22.2 0.9 0.9 0.0 
ADR 8.6 9.8 -1.2 -1.6 0.4 
Déi Greng 10.7 11.1 -0.4 0.7 -1.1 
other 4.8 2.8 2.0 1.8 0.2 
Pedersen index     4.6 4.6 1.1 
            
THE NETHERLANDS EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
PvdA* 20 24.7 -4.7 0.9 -5.6 
CDA 26.9 20.9 6.0 1.2 4.8 
VVD* 19.8 23.3 -3.5 -0.5 -3.0 
D66* 5.8 7.7 -1.9 0.0 -1.9 
Groen Links 11.9 12.6 -0.7 -1.0 0.3 
SP 5 4.8 0.2 -0.9 1.1 
RPF, GPV, SGP 8.7 4.8 3.9 -0.3 4.2 
Other 1.9 1.3 0.6 0.5 0.1 
Pedersen index     10.8 2.7 10.5 
            
PORTUGAL EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
PS* 43.1 50.2 -7.1 -4.8 -2.3 
PSD 31.1 30 1.1 0.9 0.2 
CDS/PP 10.3 7.6 2.7 2.2 0.5 
CDU 13.8 8.8 5.0 3.1 1.9 
Other 1.7 3.4 -1.7 -1.4 -0.3 
Pedersen index     8.8 6.2 2.6 
            
SPAIN  EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







 (%)  (EP-NP)   
PP Partido Popular* 39.8 43.6 -3.8 -3.8 0.0 
PSOE 35.3 33.2 2.1 1.0 1.1 
Izquirda Unida 5.8 6 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 
CiU Convergencia i Unio* 4.4 3.4 1.0 0.6 0.4 
BNG Bloq nacionalista Galego 1.9 1.6 0.3 0.3 0.0 
P Coalicion Nacionalista 
 & Europa de los Pueblos 
0.4 0 0.4 0.4 0.0 
CE Coalicion Europea 0.4 0 0.4 0.4 0.0 
Other 12 12.2 -0.2 1.2 -1.4 
Pedersen index      4.2 4.0 1.5 
            
SWEDEN EP Vote (%) 
Counterfactual 







      
Vänsterpartiet 15.9 21.7 -5.8 0.6 -6.4 
Socialdemokraterna* 26.1 27.1 -1.0 -3.0 2.0 
Miljöpartiet 9.4 5.5 3.9 3.5 0.4 
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Centerpartiet 6 4.7 1.3 2.3 -1.0 
Folkpartiet 13.7 5.8 7.9 5.3 2.6 
Kristdemokraterna 7.7 8.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.2 
Moderaterna 20.6 26.4 -5.8 -8.4 2.6 
Other 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.3 -0.1 
Pedersen index     13.3 12.0 7.7 
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TABLES AND GRAPHS 
 
Table 2.1: European (EP) and national (NP) parliamentary election results in 
Luxembourg and Belgium – distribution of valid votes 
Country  Party EP vote (%) NP vote (%) Difference 
(EP – NP) 
Luxembourg CSV/PCS 31.9 30.2 1.7 
 DP/PD 20.8 22.0 -1.2 
 LSAP/POSL 23.1 24.2 -1.1 
 ADR 8.6 10.5 -1.9 
 Déi Greng 10.7 7.5 3.2 
 other 4.8 2.8 2.0 
     
Belgium: Flemish  SP 7.7 9.6 -1.9 
parties VLD 11.9 14.3 -2.4 
 Agalev 6.6 7.0 -0.4 
 CVP 12.2 14.1 -1.9 
 Vlaams Blok 9.0 9.9 -0.9 
 VU-ID21 6.6 5.6 -1.0 
Belgium: Walloon  PS 11.6 10.2 1.4 
parties PRL-FDF-MCC 12.1 10.1 2.0 
 Ecolo 10.2 7.4 2.8 
 PSC 2.6 5.9 -3.3 
 FN 0.7 1.5 -0.8 
 Other 9.0 4.4 4.6 
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Table 2.2: Germany, distribution of votes in European parliamentary and 
(hypothetical) national parliamentary elections - 1999 
  
EP vote  
(%)  
Counterfactual 




NP Vote (%)  
CDU/CSU 48.7 52.8 -4.1 35.1 
SPD 30.6 33.2 -2.6 40.9 
Bundis90/Grünen 6.4 5.9 0.5 6.7 
FDP 3.0 2.0 1.0 6.2 
PDS 5.8 1.0 4.8 5.1 
Other 6.4 5.1 1.3 6.0 
Pedersen index   6.7  
 
 
Ch. 2, p. 25 
 
Table 2.3:  Pedersen index: difference  between EP and NP party vote share 
Country Difference EP-NP Country Difference EP-NP 
Austria 9.8 Greece 8.0 
Belgium: Flanders 8.9 Ireland 13.3 
Belgium: Wallonia 7.1 Italy 9.8 
Britain 20.5 Luxembourg 4.6 
Denmark 31.6 Netherlands 10.8 
Finland 7.3 Portugal 8.8 
France 22.7 Spain 4.2 
Germany 6.7 Sweden 13.3 
EU average   11.7 
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Table 2.4:  Quasi-switchers as percentage of all EP voters, per country 1989-1999 
Country 1989 1994 1999 Country 1989 1994 1999 
Austria -- -- 13.4 Greece 8.1 12.4 9.6 
Belgium: Flanders 15.6 16.5 10.9 Ireland 28.7 23.8 32.3 
Belgium: Wallonia 10.3 20.0 23.3 Italy 19.7 20.7 32.0 
Britain 13.0 16.0 22.3 Luxembourg 15.0 14.3 15.5 
Denmark 35.4 42.9 39.8 Netherlands 12.4 19.6 13.9 
Finland -- -- 17.7 Portugal 9.7 12.7 7.5 
France 27.2 40.8 25.4 Spain 22.2 12.5 15.5 
Germany 11.8 14.2 16.9 Sweden -- -- 24.2 
EU average 
 (12 countries) 










Note:  Data for 1989 and 1994 from van der Eijk, Franklin and Mackie, 1996, Table 17.3.  
No 1989 and 1994 data available for Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
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Table 2.5: Turnout rates in European and most recent preceding national elections  
Country Turnout EP 
Turnout 





Austria 49.4 86.0 Ireland 50.2 66.1 
Belgium*∞ 91.0 90.6 Italy∞ 70.8 82.9 
Britain 24.0 71.5 Luxembourg*∞ 87.3 86.5 
Denmark 50.5 86.0 Netherlands 30.0 73.2 
Finland 31.4 65.3 Portugal 40.0 66.3 
France 46.8 68.0 Spain 63.0 78.1 
Germany 45.2 82.2 Sweden 38.8 81.4 
Greece∞ 75.3 76.4    
EU average   52.9 77.4 
EU Average (non-compulsory voting countries only) 42.7 74.9 
Note *: National parliamentary elections concurrent with European parliamentary elections 
Note ∞: Compulsory voting. 
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Table 2.6:  Germany, Quasi-switching and turnout effects EP 1999 (Positive effects 












        
CDU/CSU 48.7 52.8 -4.1 -5.9 1.8 
SPD* 30.6 33.2 -2.6 0.9 -3.5 
Bundis90/Grünen* 6.4 5.9 0.5 0.0 0.5 
FDP 3 2 1.0 0.8 0.2 
PDS 5.8 1 4.8 4.7 0.1 
other 5.4 5.1 0.3 -0.6 0.9 
      
Pedersen index   6.7 6.5 3.5 
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Table 2.7: Pedersen index: Total, Quasi-switching & Turnout effects, EU 
countries 
  Total Difference  Quasi-switching Turnout 
     
Austria  9.8 7.6 5.2 
Belgium: Flanders  8.9 9.2 0.5 
Belgium: Wallonia  7.1 7.7 7.1 
Britain  20.5 12.7 11.0 
Denmark  31.6 31.4 2.8 
Finland  7.3 13.0 7.6 
France  22.7 22.6 1.9 
Germany  6.7 6.5 3.5 
Greece  8.0 8.1 1.0 
Ireland  13.3 14.5 4.1 
Italy  9.8 11.0 1.7 
Luxembourg  4.6 4.6 1.1 
Netherlands  10.8 2.7 10.5 
Portugal  8.8 6.2 2.6 
Spain  4.2 4.0 1.5 
Sweden  13.3 12.0 7.7 
     
Average  11.7 10.8 4.3 
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Table 2.8: Determinants of Quasi-switching (OLS regression, robust standard 
errors, n=111) 
B Beta Sig 
Party stance on EU integration (adverse-favorable) -.836 -.327 .007 
Party left-right position -.323 -.167 .065 
Extremity of party left-right position -.968 -.300 .000 
Size of party (votes share in last NP election) -.240 -.739 .001 
Electoral Cycle (0-1) -3.074 -.231 .049 
Electoral Cycle (0-1) * size of party .256 .550 .027 








Del Castillo, Pilar (1996). Spain: a Dress Rehearsal for the National elections” in Cees van 
der Eijk & Mark Franklin Choosing Europe 
Franklin, Mark & John Curtice (1996). “Britain: opening Pandora’s box” in Cees van der Eijk 
& Mark Franklin Choosing Europe 
Huber, P. J. (1967). The behavior of maximum likelihood estimates under non-standard 
conditions. Proceedings of the fifth Berkeley Symposium on mathematical statistics and 
probability, 1, 221-233. 
Mannheimer, Renato (1996) “Italy: Consulting the Oracle” in Cees van der Eijk & Mark 
Franklin Choosing Europe 
Oppenhuis, R.V., C. van der Eijk, C. & M. Franklin (1996). The Party Context: Outcomes, 
in: C. van der Eijk & M. Franklin (eds.), Choosing Europe? The European Electorate 
and National Politics in the Face of Union. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press. 
Pacek, Alexander & Benjamin Radcliff (2003). Voter participation and Party-group fortunes 
in European Parliament Elections, 1979-1999: A Cross-National Analysis. Political 
Research Quarterly Vol 56, no 1, pp. 91-95 
Papke, Leslie E, and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. 1996. Econometric models for fractional 
response variables with an application to 401 (K) plan participation rates. Journal of 
Applied Econometrics 11:619-632. 
Pedersen, M.N. (1979). The Dynamics of the European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of 
Electoral Volatility. European Journal of Political Research 7:1-26. 
Reif, K. & H. Schmitt (1980). „Nine Second-Order National Elections. A Conceptual 
Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results“. European Journal for 
Political Research 8: 3-44. 
Van der Eijk, C. & M. Franklin (1996). Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and 
National Politics in the Face of Union. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Van der Eijk, Cees & Marcel van Egmond (forthcoming). Political effects of low turnout in 
National and European Elections. Electoral Studies, forthcoming.  
Van der Eijk, Cees, Mark Franklin & Tom Mackie (1996). “The Dog that did not Bark: the 
1994 elections in the light of 1989” in Cees van der Eijk & Mark Franklin Choosing 
Europe 
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct 
test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48, 817-838. 
 
